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STRONG COMPOSITION DOWN. 









This paper is devoted to the study of claims problems. We identify the family of 
rules that satisfy strong composition down (robustness with respect to reevaluations of the 
estate)  and consistency (robustness with respect to changes in the set of agents) 
together. We call to that family the backbone family, which is a generalization of the 
weighted constrained  equal awards rules. In addition, once strong composition down is 
combined with homogeneity only the weighted constrained equal awards rules survive. We 
also prove that the  constrained equal awards rule is the unique rules satisfying  strong 
composition down and equal treatment of equals together. 
 
Keywords: strong composition down, backbone rules, constrained equal awards 
rule, weighted constrained equal awards rules. 
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 1 Introduction
The question of the adjudication of conﬂicting demands was ﬁrstly addressed by O’Neill (1982).
This class of claims problems refers to all those situations in which a given quantity of a certain
commodity has to be distributed among some agents when the available resource falls short
of the total demand. The canonical example used to illustrate such a class of problems is the
allotment of the liquidation value when a ﬁrm goes bankrupt. The reader is referred to Thomson
(2003) for a widely exposition of the literature.
Any claims problem is determined by three elements, a set of agents, the available amount of
resource, called estate, and a vector of demands or claims. A rule is a way of distributing the
available estate among the agents according to their claims. We follow in this work the axiomatic
approach, defending the rules in terms of the properties they satisfy. Those properties usually
refer to notions of equity and stability.
One of the most widely studied rules is the so-called constrained equal awards rule. It comes
from Maimonides (12th Century), and proposes that all individuals should be treated uniformly.
This implies that, for any vector of claims, all the agents that do not get her claim receive equal
amounts, independently of how small or large the estate is. A generalization of this idea is
behind the weighted constrained equal awards rules. The objective is to favor agents who are
perceived as more deserving. For a given vector of positive weights, and for any vector of claims,
in a weighted constrained equal awards rule all the agents that do not get her claim receive
amounts that, when divided by their respective weights, are equal, independently of how small
or large the estate is. We propose in this paper a further extension: the backbone rules.1 The
rules in the backbone family are in line of the two aforementioned rules. But, unlike them, for
any vector of claims, all the agents that do not get her claim receive an amount that does depend
on how small or large the estate is.
Among the procedural properties normally required, composition down emerges as a useful
requirement. Imagine that when, estimating the value of the estate, we were too optimistic, and
the actual value was smaller than expected. Now, two alternatives are open. Either we solve the
new problem. Or we consider a problem in which the estate is the reduced one, and the claims
are the allocations obtained with the overestimated estate. The property of composition down
requires the ﬁnal allocation to be independent of the chosen alternative. In this property is
implicitly assumed that, either all agents unanimously demand the original claims, or all agents
unanimously demand the awards for the overestimated estate. We propose here to revise such
an assumption, and to consider the possibility that some demand their original claim while the
others demand their adjusted claims to the awards for the overestimated estate. Again, two
alternatives appear: either to solve the problem under the new claims vector or directly. If the
ﬁnal allocation is always independent of the chosen alternative, we say that our rule satisﬁes
1The name will become clearer in Section 2. It is comes form its graphical representation, since it looks a
backbone.
2strong composition down. This new property states that agents will not beneﬁt from insisting on
their initial claims when others accept the reduction given by the tentative awards corresponding
to the overestimated estate.
We also consider a property that provides robustness with respect to changes in the set of agents.
Consistency refers to a situation in which a tentative distribution of the estate has been made,
and an agent leaves the problem after accepting her award. It states the reduced problem to be
solved in such a way that all remaining agents are allotted exactly the same amount as they did
originally.
Our main results says that the unique solutions satisfying strong composition down and consis-
tency together are the rules within the backbone family. Moreover, once these properties are
combined with some other standard principles, such as homogeneity (the rules is immune to
changes in the scale of the estate and claims), or equal treatment of equals (equal agents receive
equal awards), we end up with the weighted constrained equal awards or the constrained equal
awards rules, respectively.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we set up the model and we present
the backbone family. In Section 3 we introduce the property of strong composition down and we
present our main result. In Section 4 we explore other properties the backbone family may fulﬁll,
as well as we provide alternative characterizations of the weighted constrained equal awards and
the constrained equal awards rules. In Section 5 we conclude with some ﬁnal comments and
remarks. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Statement of the model. The backbone rules
Let N be the set of all potential agents. Let N denote the family of all ﬁnite subsets of N.
Let γ ∈ R be the upper bound, large enough, for the agents’ demand.2 In a claims problem,
or simply a problem, a ﬁxed amount E ∈ R++ (called estate) has to be distributed among
a group of agents N ∈ N according to their claims (represented by c = (ci)i∈N ∈ [0,γ]N)
when E is not enough to fully satisfy all the claims. Therefore, a problem is given by a triple
e = (N,E,c) where
P
i∈N ci ≥ E and ci ≤ γ for all i ∈ N. We denote by CN the class of claims
problems with ﬁxed population N, and by C the class of all claims problems.
CN =
(





2This upper bound is not usually considered in the literature of claims problems. All the results in this
paper remain unchanged without this assumption. The only diﬀerence is the technique used to prove the main
theorem. Without the upper bound it can be done by contradiction, while with this minor restriction the proof






We denote by C =
P
i∈N ci the aggregate claim.
An awards vector for e ∈ C is a distribution of the estate among the agents, that is, it is a list
x ∈ RN
+ such that: (a) Each agent receives a non-negative amount which is not larger than her
claim (for each i ∈ N, 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci); and (b) the estate is exactly distributed (
P
i∈N xi = E).
Let X(e) be the set of all awards vectors for e ∈ C. A rule is a way of selecting awards vectors,
that is, it is a function, S : C −→
S
e∈C X(e), that selects, for each problem e ∈ C, a unique
awards vector S(e) ∈ X(e).
Let S be a rule, and let c be a ﬁxed vector of claims, pS(c) is the path followed by S(E,c) as the
estate E varies from 0 to C. The path pS(c) is called path of awards of S for c. It is worth
noting that any rule can be deﬁned by the collection of all paths of awards for the diﬀerent
claims vectors.
The following are two of the most prominent rules in the literature. Each of them corresponds to
diﬀerent ideas of fairness in the distribution of the estate. The ﬁrst one follows the Aristotelian
notion of justice, and proposes a distribution of the estate proportional to the claims.
Proportional rule, p: For each e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector p(e) = λ c for some
λ ∈ R such that
P
i∈N λ   ci = E.
The second comes from Maimonides (12th Century). It defends that agents should be treated
equally, independently of their diﬀerences in claims. Thus, the so-called constrained equal awards
rule proposes equality in gains, adjusting, if it is necessary, to ensure that no agent receives more
than her claim.
Constrained equal awards rule, cea: For each e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector
cea(e) = min{c,λ} for some λ ∈ R such that
P
i∈N min{ci,λ} = E.
Now we consider a family of rules, the so-called weighted constrained equal awards rules. As its
name suggests, they are a generalization of the constrained equal awards rule. In the cea rule,
agents’ claims are fully comparable. But it may happen that diﬀerences in agents’ needs ask
for some adjustments. This can be made by mean of a vector of weights. For each i ∈ N, let
αi ∈ R++ be claimant i’s weight, and α = (αi)i∈N the vector of weights. These weights reﬂect
how much deserving each agent is.
Weighted constrained equal awards rule with weights α = (αi)i∈N, ceaα: For each
e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector ceaα(e) = min{c,αλ} for some λ ∈ R such that
P
i∈N min{ci,αi   λ} = E.
It is quite obvious that the constrained equal awards rule is a particular weighted constrained
equal awards rule when all the agents have the same weight.
4Figure 1 illustrates the three aforementioned rules by showing the paths of awards for several
claim vectors.



























Figure 1: Path of awards for diﬀerent claims in two-agents problems. (a) Propor-
tional rule. (b) Constrained equal awards rule. (c) Weighted constrained equal
awards rule for α = (2,1). Γ denotes the claim vector all whose components are
equal to γ, Γ = (γ,...,γ).
For the sake of exposition, assume that we are in the two-agent framework, N = {i,j}. For
a given rule S, and for each problem e = (N,E,c), we deﬁne the awards rate rS(e) as the
share of ith agent’s award enjoyed by j when none of them is fully granted, i.e., rS(e) =
Sj(e)
Si(e).
For the aforementioned rules, the awards rates are the following: rp(e) =
cj





Therefore, the main diﬀerence, in terms of the awards rate, between the proportional and the
weighted constrained equal awards rules is that, while for the ﬁrst rule the awards rate depends
on the claims, for the second one it is constant no matter the claims.
In comparing the constrained equal awards rule with a weighted constrained equal awards rule,
both awards rates are constant independently of the agents’ demand and the estate. Notice that,
within the weighted constrained equal awards family, the awards rate represents how deserving
agent i is in front of agent j. Here, we propose a generalization of the latter family (that we
call backbone family), keeping the awards rate independent of the claims, but dependent on the
estate. The reason for that is, even in the case that some agents are perceived as more deserving
than others, such a degree of merit may vary with the size of the resource to allot. Hence, let xi
and xj be the awards for agents i and j when none of the is fully satisﬁed. For the constrained
equal awards rule, xi is always equal to xj, no matter the estate. For a weighted constrained
equal awards rule, xi is always equal to wi
wjxj, no matter the estate. For the backbone rules, the
5relation between xi and xj may depend on the estate. Hence, when the amount to divide is too
little agents may receive equal or ”almost” awards (xi = xj, for example), while when the the
amount to divide is too large their awards may diﬀer signiﬁcantly (xi = x2
j, for example).
We provide now a formal deﬁnition of the backbone family. Let p(Γ) an increasing (and
continuous) path from (0,...,0) to Γ = (γ,...,γ). Associated to each possible path p(Γ) we
deﬁne the backbone rule for p = p(Γ).
Backbone rule for p, Bp: For each e ∈ C, it selects the unique awards vector Bp(e) =





Roughly speaking, and in terms of paths, each member of the backbone family is described a
main path (or backbone) from which vertical and horizontal bones start (see Figure 2). It is
quite obvious that the backbone family is a generalization of the weighted constrained equal
awards family.


























Figure 2: Illustration of the path of awards of three rules in the backbone family. (a)
is the constrained equal awards rule and (c) is a weighted constrained equal awards
rule. All the three rules have in common a backbone from (0,...,0) to Γ = (γ,...,γ).
Example 2.1. Let p(Γ) be a main path (backbone) that, for the two-agents case, can be
parameterized by p(Γ) = (z, z2
γ ) with z ∈ [0,γ] (Case b in Figure 2). Next table shows how the
cea, cea(2,1), and Bp rules apply.
3Notice that, unlike the case of the weighted and non-weighted constrained equal awards rules, in this deﬁnition
λ
p denotes an n-dimensional point in p(Γ).
6Rules
c E cea cea(2,1) Bp
(30,9) 6 (3,3) (4,2) (5.67,0.32)
(30,9) 24 (15,9) (16,8) (20,4)
(30,9) 28 (19,9) (19,9) (22.80,5.19)
(15,40) 9 (4.5,4.5) (6,3) (8.30,0.69)
(15,40) 24 (12,12) (16,8) (15,9)
3 Two properties. Strong composition down and consistency.
Next property has been widely studied in the literature of claims problems. And it is particularly
useful when some uncertainty over the estate exists. Let e = (N,E′,c) be the problem to solve,
and let x be the awards vector selected by a rule S for that problem. Imagine that when
estimating the value of the estate, we were too optimistic, and the actual value E is smaller
than expected E < E′. Now, two claims vectors arise as legitimate demands. The ﬁrst one is
the original claims vector c, and the second one is the promised awards x. Composition down
requires that, independently of which demands vector we consider, we end up with the same
allocation.4
Composition down: For each e ∈ C and each E′ ∈ R+ such that C > E′ > E, then
S(e) = S(N,E,S(N,E′,c)).
Therefore, composition down refers to the division of E from two diﬀerent reference claims
vectors. One in which the agents are claiming c, and another one in which the agents are
claiming x = S(N,E′,c). It is worth noting that, in the formulation of the property it is
implicitly assumed that, either all the agents unanimously demand the original claims c, or
all the agents unanimously demand the promised award x. Next property allows intermediate
situations, where one or several demanders may deviate from the consensus either on c or x.
Strong composition down, in the spirit of composition down, requires that the allocation does
not depend on such deviations. This property is also preventing strategic behaviors. If a mistake
in the evaluation of the estate occurs, and a reevaluation of the estate is necessary, no agent
i ∈ N can manipulate her or other agents’ allocation by imposing as demand ci or xi.
Strong composition down: For each e ∈ C, each E′ ∈ R+ such that C > E′ > E, and each
T ⊆ N, then S(e) = S(N,E,(ST(N,E′,c),cN T)).
Strong composition down looks very demanding. But, actually, there are a lot of rules satisfying
this property. Among them, the constrained and weighted constrained equal awards rules (the
proportional, for example, does not). Any backbone rule also fulﬁls strong composition down.
Now let us consider a procedural property related to changes in the agent set. Suppose that,
4This property was formulated by Moulin (2000).
7after solving a problem, some agents leave with their awards. The remaining agents re-valuate
the new situation allocating among them the remaining estate. Consistency requires that each
of these agents receive the amount they received before the re-valuation.5.




Let N,N′ ∈ N be two set of agents such that N′ ⊂ N. Consistency implies that the projection
of the path of awards for N onto the subspace relative to N′ coincides with the path of awards
for N′. Let us consider a rule S such that, when N = {1,2,3} it coincides with the constrained
equal awards, and when N = {1,2} it does with a dictatorial rule in favor of 1 (as the limit
case of a weighted constrained equal awards rule). In comparing agent 1 with agent 2, this rule
is quite fair for the second one when agent 3 is present, but extremely unfair when agent 3 is
not. Consistency avoids this type of drawbacks. All the rules presented in the previous section,
as they are deﬁned there, are consistent. Nevertheless, if we consider a weighted constrained
equal awards rule (resp. backbone rule) whose weights (resp. main backbone) depend on the
particular set of agents involved in each problem, then such a rule is not consistent.
Now we present our main result. It identiﬁes the family of rules that satisfy strong composition
down and consistency together. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. The backbone rules are the only rules satisfying strong composition down and
consistency together.
4 Fairness
Imagine that we change the units in which the estate and claims are measured, passing, for
example, from dollars to euros. It is desirable that the division of the estate proposed by the
rule is not aﬀected by this change. Homogeneity requires that, if estate and claims are multiplied
by the same positive amount, the same happens to the awards vector.
Homogeneity. For each e = (N,E,c) ∈ C and each λ ∈ R+, S(N,λE,λc) = λS(N,E,c).
The weighted constrained equal awards rules are homogenous. Regarding to the backbone family,
some backbone rules satisfy homogeneity and some others do not.
Note that any weighted constrained equal awards rule is a member of the backbone family, and
then it satisﬁes strong composition down and consistency. Next result sets that, in fact, only
those rules fulﬁll strong composition down, consistency, and homogeneity together.
Corollary 4.1. The weighted constrained equal awards rules are the only rules satisfying ho-
mogeneity, strong composition down, and consistency together.
5This property has been widely studied in Thomson (1998).
8When we deal with rationing situations, we always want to introduce a minimal requirement of
fairness. Equal treatment of equals is very mild in this sense, and it simply requires equal agents
to be treated equally. That is, agents with equals claims should receive equal awards.
Equal treatment of equals. For each e ∈ C and each {i,j} ⊆ N, if ci = cj then Si(e) = Sj(e).
Corollary 4.2. The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of
equals, strong composition down, and consistency together.
Most of the characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule provided by the existing
literature use three types of properties, one of each type. First, those involving impartiality
principles, as it is the case of fairness. Second, stability with respect to changes in the in estate,
as it is the case of composition down or its dual. Finally, the third type of properties, and the
most controversial one, refers to very particular value judgements. As an illustration, Herrero
and Villar (2001) contains two examples of those properties, conditional full compensation and
exemption, where agents with small claims are deliberately protected. The last corollary avoids
the latter type of principles, imposing only impartiality and stability with non-manipulability.
5 Final remarks
In this work we have presented a new generalization of the weighted constrained equal awards
rules, the backbone family. Both families have in common that they favor agents who are
perceived as more deserving. The diﬀerence is that such a perception of deservingness is constant
for the weighted constrained equal awards rule, while for the backbone rules it depends on the size
of the estate. We have also introduced the property of strong composition down as a revision of
composition down. Strong composition down and consistency characterize the backbone family.
Moreover, by adding homogeneity to those properties we end up with the weighted constrained
equal awards family. And by adding equal treatment of equals we end up with the constrained
equal awards rule.
For the present paper, we have implicitly considered rules from the point of view of gains.
Nevertheless, it is quite common in the literature to make the dual analysis as well. Two rules
are dual is one of them allocates awards in the same way the other one allocates loses. Thus,
the dual of the constrained equal awards and the weighted constrained equal awards rules are
the so-called constrained equal losses and weighted constrained equal losses rules, respectively.6
Similarly, we may deﬁne a new family as that resulting from considering the dual of the backbone
family. Analogously to the rules, the notion of duality is applied to the properties as well. Two
properties are dual is whenever a rule satisﬁes one of the properties, the dual of such a rule
satisﬁes the other property. Homogeneity and equal treatment of equals are self-dual (the dual
property is itself), while the dual of composition down is composition up. Again, we may consider
6The reader is referred to Thomson (2003) for a formal description of both.
9the dual property of strong composition down, whose ﬂavor goes along the lines of composition
up in the same way strong composition down does with respect to composition down. In view of
Theorem 3.1, and using the characterization by duality result in Herrero and Villar (2001), the
dual of strong composition down and consistency characterize the dual of the backbone family.
10Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.1, preceded by some deﬁnitions and technical
results.
Resource monotonicity stipulates that no agent is penalized as a consequence of an increase in
the estate.
Resource monotonicity. For each e = (N,E,c),e′ = (N,E′,c) ∈ C, if E′ > E, then S(e′) ≥
S(e).
Let us consider an awards vector with the following feature. For each two-agent subset, the
rule chooses the restriction of that allocation for the associated reduced problem to this agent
subset. Converse consistency requires that the allocation is the one selected by the rule for the
original problem.7
Let c.con(e;S) ≡ {x ∈ RN
+ :
P




Converse consistency. For each e ∈ C, c.con(e;S)  = φ, and if x ∈ c.con(e;S), then x = S(e).
Lemma 5.1 (Elevator Lemma, Thomson (1998)). If a rule S is consistent and coincides with
a conversely consistent rule S′ in the two agent case, then it coincides with S′ in general.
Proposition 5.1 (Chun (1999)). Resource monotonicity and consistency together imply con-
verse consistency.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
It is not diﬃcult to check that any backbone rule satisﬁes strong composition down and consis-
tency. It is also straightforward that strong composition down implies composition down and
the latter resource monotonicity. Therefore, in application of Proposition 5.1, any backbone
rule is converse consistent. Let S be a rule fulﬁlling strong composition down and consistency.
Let us deﬁne the path p = pS(Γ) as the path of awards of rule S for claims vector Γ. We show
that S = Bp. By the Elevator Lemma, it is enough to prove the result in the two-agents case.
We assume that N = {i,j} and ci ≤ cj. For a given claims vector c, let y ∈ p(Γ) be a vector
such that yi = ci and yj < cj. And let z ∈ p(Γ) be a vector such that zj = cj and zi > ci. We
distinguish several cases.
Case 1. If c ∈ p(Γ). Let E ∈ [0,
P
i∈N ci]. Note that, since c ∈ p(Γ), S(N,
P
i∈N ci,Γ) = c
by deﬁnition of path of awards. Then S(N,E,c) = S(N,E,S(
P
i∈N ci,Γ)). By strong
composition down, S(N,E,S(
P
i∈N ci,Γ)) = S(N,E,Γ) = Bp(N,E,Γ) = Bp(N,E,c).
Therefore, S(N,E,c) = Bp(N,E,c).
7This property was formulated by Chun (1999).
11Case 2. If c / ∈ p(Γ) and E ≤
P
i∈N yi. By Case 1, S(N,
P
i∈N yi,z) = Bp(N,
P
i∈N yi,z) = y.















= S(N,E,c). Since z ∈ p(Γ), by Case
1, we know that S(N,E,z) = Bp(N,E,z) = Bp(N,E,c). Therefore, S(N,E,c) =
Bp(N,E,c).
Case 3. If c / ∈ p(Γ) and E >
P
i∈N yi. Note that, on one hand, by strong composition down,
S(
P
i∈N yi,c) = S(
P





i∈N yi,c) = y. Then, c ≥ S(E,c) ≥ y. Therefore, S(E,c) = Bp(E,c).
Therefore, S and Bp coincides in the two-agents case, and then they do so in general.










































Figure 3: Illustration of the proof for the two-agent case. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
(c) Case 3.
12Remark 5.1. The proportional rule satisﬁes consistency but it fails to satisfy strong composition
down. A rule satisfying strong composition down but not consistency can be deﬁned as follows.
S(e) =
(
cea(2,1)(e) if N = {1,2}
cea(e) otherwise
The properties that characterize the backbone family are, therefore, independent.
Proof of Corollary 4.2.
This proof comes from Thomson (2006). They characterize the set of homogeneous rules. By
using their result it is not diﬃcult to check that the only homogeneous rules in the backbone
family are the weighted constrained equal awards rules.
Proof of Corollary 4.2.
By Theorem 3.1 is enough to show that the constrained equal awards rule is the unique backbone
rule satisfying equal treatment of equals. In term of paths of awards, a rule S satisﬁes equal
treatment of equals if and only if the diagonal is the path of awards of S for claims Γ, that is, if
(λ,...,λ) ∈ pS(Γ) for all λ ≤ γ. Therefore, Bp = cea.
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